Appalachian History Series
April 5, 2010
Just after three in the afternoon at Montcoal, West Virginia, a methane ignition inside the Upper Big Branch South mine became an explosion that swept through the workings. Twenty nine miners were killed, and two survived with injuries. Federal investigators later said the disaster was preventable.
What investigators found
Federal and state teams reconstructed the blast and its causes. MSHA’s internal review describes an ignition on the longwall face that grew into a coal dust explosion because dust was not sufficiently rendered inert, water sprays and other controls were not maintained, and deficiencies in ventilation allowed methane to accumulate. The report ties the catastrophe to violations of fundamental safety standards.
West Virginia’s investigative hub preserves maps that trace flame travel and overpressure, as well as interview transcripts with miners and officials. Those materials document recurring problems with ventilation and dusting that preceded the explosion.
Warnings on the record before the blast
MSHA’s own post disaster review found that Upper Big Branch had among the highest levels of elevated enforcement actions in the country the year before the explosion, and that hundreds of violations were cited in the 18 months prior. At the same time, the agency acknowledged missed opportunities and shortcomings in how some tools were used.
Converging conclusions
Three major investigations reached similar bottom lines. MSHA’s accident investigation concluded that corporate practices and violations allowed a methane spark to trigger a deadly dust explosion, and the Department of Labor publicly identified that corporate culture as the root cause. The Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel report, led by Davitt McAteer, described chronic ventilation problems, inadequate rock dusting, and management pressure that undermined safety. West Virginia’s official report, maps, and transcripts preserve the technical and human record in primary form.
Accountability in court and Congress
After Massey’s assets were acquired by Alpha Natural Resources, the Justice Department announced a 209 million dollar resolution that combined restitution, penalties, and required safety investments. The accompanying non prosecution agreement sets out the terms in detail.
Individuals were prosecuted as well. Security chief Hughie Elbert Stover was convicted of obstruction and false statements. Superintendent Gary May pleaded guilty and received a 21 month sentence. Former executive David Hughart pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 42 months.
Former Massey CEO Don Blankenship’s misdemeanor conviction for conspiracy to willfully violate mine safety standards withstood post conviction challenges in the Fourth Circuit, and his later defamation suits failed on appeal, with the Supreme Court declining review.
Congressional hearings in 2010 through 2012 took testimony from miners, families, and officials. Lawmakers examined the investigation records and pressed for stronger enforcement in the year after the disaster.
From reports to rules and practice
UBB triggered agency self examination and outside review. MSHA conducted an internal review, NIOSH led an independent panel assessment of that review, and the Department of Labor’s Inspector General audited progress, confirming dozens of recommendations implemented within the first two years.
One practical change was wider field use of the Coal Dust Explosibility Meter, a handheld device that checks whether dust mixtures are capable of propagating flame. NIOSH published the technical basis as Information Circular 9529, and MSHA issued a Program Information Bulletin on its use.
Why it matters in Appalachia
Upper Big Branch belongs to a long Appalachian history in which production pressure, dust and gas, and enforcement capacity collide beneath the mountains. The disaster spurred reforms, from more aggressive use of elevated enforcement to better dust control and verification. Those changes do not erase the loss of twenty nine men, yet they remain a living memorial that reduces the chance of another mine wide explosion in our region.
Sources and further reading
MSHA, Internal Review of MSHA’s Actions at the Upper Big Branch Mine South, Executive Summary, March 6, 2012. Mine Health and Safety Administration
US Department of Labor, news release on MSHA’s accident report and findings, December 6, 2011. DOL
West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training, Upper Big Branch Investigative Report hub and Flames and Forces map. minesafety.wv.gov+1
Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel, Report to the Governor, May 2011. NPR.org
DOJ, Alpha Natural Resources agreement and non prosecution agreement, December 6, 2011. Justice Department+1
FBI and DOJ releases on Hughie Elbert Stover, Gary May, and David Hughart. Federal Bureau of Investigation+2Justice Department+2
Fourth Circuit opinions in United States v. Blankenship, 2021, and Blankenship v. NBCUniversal, 2023, plus Supreme Court certiorari denial. Fourth Circuit Court+2Fourth Circuit Court+2
Senate HELP Committee hearing, March 31, 2011, and House Education and the Workforce hearing, March 27, 2012. GovInfo+1
House Education and Labor field hearing in Beckley, West Virginia, May 24, 2010. GovInfo
NIOSH, Coal Dust Explosibility Meter Evaluation and Recommendations for Application, IC 9529, and MSHA Program Information Bulletin on CDEM. CDC+2CDC+2